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State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 7 (Mar. 17, 2011)1 
Criminal Law and Procedure 
Summary 
An appeal of the Second Judicial District Court’s denial of the State’s motion to correct a 
reduced sentence imposed upon revocation of probation. 
Disposition/Outcome 
The district court’s order affirmed.  It was within the court’s discretion to apply NRS 
453.3405(2)’s substantial-assistance exception  to “reduce” the defendant’s sentence below the 
statutory minimum provided in NRS 453.3385 upon revoking his probation. 
Factual and Procedural History 
In January 2008, Arthur Lucero (“Lucero”) pleaded guilty to one count of level-three 
trafficking in a controlled substance, a violation of NRS. 453.3385(3), which carried a 
mandatory minimum prison term of ten years.2  However, because the court determined Lucero 
rendered “substantial assistance” to law enforcement, the district court had discretion under NRS 
453.3405(2) to reduce or suspend Lucero’s mandatory minimum sentence.3  The district court 
therefore sentenced Lucero to life in prison with eligibility for parole after ten years, but 
suspended his sentence, placing him on probation for up to five years. 
Several months later, Lucero violated the terms of his probation.  After a hearing, the 
district court revoked Lucero’s probation.  However, because of its prior finding of substantial 
assistance, the district court reduced Lucero’s original sentence to fifteen years with eligibility 
for parole after two years. 
The State then filed a motion to correct Lucero’s new sentence, arguing it was illegal 
because (1) the sentence violated the minimum sentence requirements of NRS 453.3385(3), and 
(2) NRS 453.3405(2)’s substantial-assistance provision was limited to original sentences 
imposed by the district court, not subsequent probation revocation proceedings.  Lucero 
countered that the applicable sentencing statute, NRS 453.3385(3), contained an exception to its 
minimum sentencing requirements for defendants who provided “substantial assistance” to law 
enforcement.  Thus, the controlling sentencing statute at the time of his probation revocation 
authorized the district court’s reduction of his sentence below the statutory ten-year minimum. 
Finding it had authority under NRS 453.3405(2) to reduce Lucero’s sentence when it 
revoked his probation, the district court denied the State’s motion to correct Lucero’s sentence.  
The State subsequently appealed the district court’s decision to the Nevada Supreme Court. 
                                                            
1  By Brian Blaylock 
2  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.3385(3) (2007). 
3  See id. § 453.3405(2). 
Discussion 
The Court focused  on interpreting NRS 176A.630(5), which precludes a district court, 
upon revoking a defendant’s probation, from sentencing the defendant to a prison term “less than 
the minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by the applicable penal statute.”4  Explaining that 
legislative intent “is the controlling factor” in statutory interpretation,5 the Court first considered 
whether the statute was plain or ambiguous.  Because NRS 176A.630(5)’s “minimum term of 
imprisonment” could reasonably include or exclude the substantial-assistance provision of NRS 
453.3405(2), the Court held that NRS 176A.630(5) is ambiguous.   
The Court then examined the legislative history, rationale, and public policy behind NRS 
176A.630(5) and 453.3405(2), respectively.  The Court ultimately rejected this additional 
information, however, because it “shed no light” on whether the legislature intended for the 
district court to have discretion to consider NRS 453.3405(2)’s substantial-assistance provision 
after revoking probation on an original sentence that had already taken this provision into 
account.   
Finally, to resolve NRS 176A.630(5)’s ambiguity, the Court applied the rule of lenity, which is a 
rule of construction that “demands that ambiguities in criminal statutes be liberally interpreted in 
the accused’s favor.”6  Accordingly, the Court held that NRS 176A.630(5)’s “minimum term of 
imprisonment” included NRS 453.3405(2)’s substantial-assistance provision.  Therefore, it was 
within the district court’s discretion to “reduce” Lucero’s sentence below the ten-year minimum 
prescribed in NRS 453.3385 upon revoking his probation. 
Conclusion 
NRS 176A.630(5)’s “minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by the applicable penal 
statute” includes NRS 453.3405(2)’s substantial-assistance provision.  Thus, it was within the 
district court’s discretion to “reduce” Lucero’s sentence below the ten-year minimum prescribed 
in NRS 453.3385 upon revoking his probation. 
                                                            
4  Id. § 176A.630(5). 
5  Robert E. v. Justice Court, 99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983). 
6  Moore v. State, 122 Nev. 27, 32, 126 P.3d 508, 511 (2006). 
